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This article proposes the notion of a security imaginary as a heuristic
tool for exploring military isomorphism (the phenomenon that
weapons and military strategies begin to look the same across the
world) at a time when the US model of defence transformation is
being adopted by an increasing number of countries. Built on a critical
constructivist foundation, the security-imaginary approach is con-
trasted with rationalist and neo-institutionalist ways of explaining
military diffusion and emulation. Merging cultural and constructivist
themes, the article offers a ‘strong cultural’ argument to explain why a
country would emulate a foreign military model and how this model is
constituted in and comes to constitute a society’s security imaginary. 
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Introduction
SINCE THE GULF WAR of 1990–91, the USA has showcased a model formilitary modernization in the information era. At first, this model wasreferred to as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and more
recently (post-9/11) as ‘transformation’. There is evidence that the RMA is
the latest military model (in this case originating in the USA) to infuse the
defence policies of an increasing number of states around the world, result-
ing in what is referred to as military isomorphism. Under the broader rubric
of military change, or the more specific themes of military emulation and 
military diffusion, a number of authors have proffered explanations for 
military isomorphism (Goldman, 2006: 76). Neorealist explanations attribute
the diffusion of a particular military model to the existence of a security
imperative in the emulating country or competition for power in an anarchi-
cal international system (see, for example, Waltz, 1979: 127; Taliaferro, 2006;
Horowitz, 2006; Resende-Santos, 2007). Neo-institutional explanations focus
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on the extent to which states and institutions in states interact with and
become socialized, not least through professional networks, into the world
cultural order (Demchak, 2000, 2002; Farrell, 2002b, 2005; Eyre & Suchman,
1996). Domestic political and structural explanations highlight the extent to
which domestic interests can be mobilized for novel ideas through advocacy
groups, entrepreneurs and political leadership (Farrell, 2001; Avant, 2000).
Cultural theories in turn attribute military emulation to cultural overlap
between societies and the extent to which cultural diversity is tolerated in the
target society (see Checkel, 1999; Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Eliason, 2003). 
This article contributes to the interrogation of the process of military isomor-
phism by developing the idea of a security imaginary as a heuristic tool. At the
time the Berlin Wall came down, Mary Kaldor (1990), the British academic and
military analyst, vividly described the Cold War as an imaginary war. This
imaginary war between East and West was brought into currency by military
exercises, war games, espionage stories, the training of millions of soldiers 
and hostile rhetoric. ‘Each system, at least in the imagination, threatened the
very existence of the other. It was a struggle between good and evil of epic 
proportions. And it was substantiated by a real military confrontation and,
indeed, real wars in remote parts of the world’ (Kaldor, 1990: 6–7). 
Kaldor argued that the experience of World War II provided a formula for
states to deal with deep-rooted problems in societies. The Cold War was a
replication of that experience, a way to impose and extend two variants of
capitalism and socialism, respectively, to ‘blocs’ of states. The construction of
ideological animosity on such a grand scale as a formula to deal with societal
problems in the postwar era was not premeditated or conspired, but an inter-
pretation of the world that eventually came to constitute the world – that is,
that had real effects on policy and lives. 
Like Kaldor’s idea of an ‘imaginary war’, the notion of a security imaginary
is founded on the belief that security and insecurity (or threat) are not objec-
tive realities that can be observed and responded to, but are constructed
through the fixing of meanings to things, an identity to ‘the self’ and others,
and the relationships that are thus instituted. In this sense, the present article
places culture at the centre of analysis, since culture is the context within
which people make sense of the world around them and which is indeed the
source of their impetus to act in a certain way and not another. In the collec-
tive, diverse imagination of a people, its members think about the ‘threats’
for their society, and the means to avoid or resist those threats. Features of the
security imaginary are substantiated by political and social discourse.
Journals, speeches, studies, proposals, conversations, reports, news broad-
casts and accounts of all kinds contribute to, and draw from, negotiated
understandings of circumstances, capabilities and ‘others’. The security
imaginary is thus not make-believe, but a powerful presence in political and
social life that amply evidences and reproduces itself. 
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The present article starts off by juxtaposing the constructivist basis of the
security-imaginary approach with the rationalist basis of neorealism, show-
ing how the latter is inadequate to explain military isomorphism. Second, the
article proceeds to explain the heuristic of a security imaginary and to situate
it within constructivist literature in international relations (IR) and security
studies. Finally, it illustrates how the security-imaginary heuristic can be
applied to enrich our understanding of military isomorphism. 
The Shortcomings of a Rationalist Approach 
Diffusion can be defined as ‘the process that involves the transmission of new
information; the decision by elites to adopt new technologies, ideas, and
practices; and ultimately the assimilation of those ideas into institutions and
practices’ (Goldman, 2006: 69). For neorealists, military diffusion is related to
external threat. States facing external insecurity will more likely adapt their
military models to those ‘contrived by the country of greatest capability and
ingenuity’ (Waltz, 1979: 127). Based on a rationalist approach to defence 
policymaking (and therefore choices about military models), neorealism
assumes ‘insecurity’ or ‘threat’ exists objectively and can be known with
some certainty. Policymakers, and those who influence them, thus identify
insecurities (or security threats) and propose appropriate responses, judging
the most effective action in a certain historical, economic, political and tech-
nological context. Moreover, in a competitive international system, it is
‘rational’ for states to emulate the most advanced military models, a process
only inhibited by a lack of information and resources (Waltz, 1979: 127).1
This article moves away from a rationalist epistemology.2 It draws on read-
ings of social imaginaries in the work of, among others, Cornelius Castoriadis
(1987) and Charles Taylor (2004). Both these authors emphasize the impor-
tance of understanding the negotiation of cultural meanings in society.
Theoretically, the article is thus grounded in constructivism and employs an
interpretive methodology that is in essence concerned with decoding and
explaining meaning. As Bevir & Rhodes (2004: 131–132) assert, ‘Interpretive
approaches start with the insight that to understand actions, practices 
and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant meanings, beliefs and prefer-
ences of the people involved.’ In this sense, culture, defined as ‘webs of
meaning’, becomes central, because meaning is context specific and humans
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military diffusion. See also Demchak’s (2000) accounts of how developing countries overcome resource
scarcity when emulating the RMA. 
2 It is recognized that both neorealist and pluralist explanations of military isomorphism share a rationalist
foundation; see Farrell (2005).
and social groups negotiate it. In the words of Clifford Geertz (1993: 9), ‘I take
culture to be those webs [of signification], and the analysis of it to be there-
fore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in
search of meaning.’3
A study by Emily E. Goldman & Thomas G. Mahnken (2004) on the diffu-
sion of the RMA in Asia can be used to illustrate the difference between a
rationalist and a constructivist/interpretive approach. Goldman and her
team of researchers aim to establish both the extent to and the way in which
the RMA (or elements thereof) is adopted and adapted by a state. The study
follows the methodology of so-called diffusion diagnostics, which involves
four key tasks that form the basis of investigation. These are: (1) identifying
the incentives or motives to adopt new practices; (2) identifying the models
that are likely to be targets of adoption or off-sets; (3) identifying the ease
with which military technology and ideas are likely to be absorbed in differ-
ent environments; and (4) capturing the results of military diffusion within
states and organizations in order to understand indigenous patterns and the
range of possible adaptations (Goldman, 2004: 4). 
Diffusion diagnostics emphasizes how a response to insecurity (or an
approach to security – the RMA) is selected and altered to fit the peculiarities
of a country’s security environment. In contrast, a constructivist approach, as
elaborated in this article, aims to establish the extent to and ways in which
the RMA (or elements thereof) is adopted (consciously or unconsciously) and
adapted (consciously or unconsciously) to fit a country’s particular security
environment as this environment is constituted by society. It also aims to outline
how that environment (or the security imaginary that constitutes that 
environment) is changed through a dialectical process. The emphasis is on
this dialectic between response and understanding of a security world. 
Tim Huxley’s (2004) exploration of RMA adoption in Singapore as part of
the Goldman study illustrates this distinction. Huxley asserts that ‘geopoliti-
cal circumstances have forced Singapore’s government to take defence
extremely seriously since the city-state separated from Malaysia in 1965’.
Geopolitical circumstances are portrayed as objectively given, not as a func-
tion of perception. The fact that ‘Singapore’s leaders have increasingly
stressed the importance of exploiting technology to compensate for the lack
of strategic depth and shortage of professional military manpower’ is seen as
part of an objective calculus in their peculiar geopolitical situation. 
A constructivist approach would ask to what extent this objective choice to
pursue the RMA is subjectively based. It would concentrate more on the 
cultural raw material that those who influence defence policy draw on when
they interpret their security situation and choose a response to it. In addition,
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3 The convergence of culturalist and constructivist themes is in line with Farrell’s (2002a) call for a coherent
cultural/constructivist research programme.
it would explore how cultural raw material finds expression in organiza-
tions. The work of Lynn Eden (2004) can be used to shed light on this aspect.
Eden employs the concepts ‘organizational frames’ and ‘knowledge-laden
organizational routines’. An organizational frame can be identified by look-
ing at what problems actors in an organization are trying to solve, how they
conceive of solutions, what assumptions about the world and organizational
purpose they bring to problem-solving, and how they explain why their acts
are sensible. Organizational frames become operational and codified in the
form of knowledge-laden routines. These routines are based on the capacity
that an organization builds through allocating resources and drawing on
expertise to solve the problems it has identified and decided to solve. What
has become organizational ‘common sense’ is embedded in organizational
routines. In this sense, the organizational frames and routines of a state’s
armed forces can be studied to get a sense of the security imaginary (see also
Farrell, 1996). 
An interpretive methodology would also open the way to a more critical
appraisal of the impact of the US construction of the RMA as a universal and
inevitable model for state defence in the 21st century on Singapore’s percep-
tions of military security, especially given that country’s close military ties
with the United States. Finally, it would ask how the pursuit of the RMA
might impact on organizational frames and, in turn, cultural factors that
ground Singaporean security perceptions.
Huxley (2004) quotes a young army officer writing in 1992: 
Our Asian heritage has unfortunately put too much premium on the value of ‘face’. We
are exceedingly hierarchy-conscious to the extent that constructive criticism is extremely
rare from bottom-up. It will take much time and deliberate effort to dispel the fear of 
. . . subordinates to speak up if they think their superiors are in the wrong, and for the
latter to accept constructive criticism.
This recurring emphasis on the need for decentralized command structures
in Singaporean defence journals is regarded by Huxley as a necessary step
towards the adoption of the RMA. An interpretive approach would see this
as a good example of how the adoption of the RMA (construed as essential
for dealing with 21st-century threats) informs organizational frames and, in
turn, broader constructions of identity in society. The dialectic process
between response and the understanding of the security world outlined
above would be made explicit. In this respect, such an interpretive approach
could also lead into an exploration and critique of the extent to which the
RMA is essentially changing how Singaporeans see themselves and their
security world. 
The circular construction of public mind and military self-understanding
occurs through military images/propaganda as well as through economic
and social restructuring to mobilize the resources needed to develop or
acquire a military model. A good illustration is the case of South Africa under
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apartheid. The acquisition and reverse engineering of Western military tech-
nology (despite arms boycotts) by South Africa, which imagined itself as 
an outpost of the West during the Cold War under threat from a ‘total 
communist onslaught’ (Nathan, Batchelor & Lamb, 1997), reproduced its
Western identity in the public mind. Coffee-table books on the South
African–Angolan war and military parades imprinted an image of a ‘legiti-
mate’ Western defence force fighting illegitimate communist terrorists, while
efforts to sustain the country’s forward-defence model reverberated through-
out society. Not only were vast sections of the economy geared towards sus-
taining the apartheid war machine, but militarization of society already
started at school level (Batchelor & Willett, 1998: 102).4 This is not a unique
situation. Examples abound of how military models infuse the public mind,
whether they be the ‘duck and cover’ exercises taught to US citizens during
the Cold War or military funding of university programmes to produce the
graduates and research necessary to sustain a particular military model. 
The Goldman study seems to go beyond a purely rationalist approach by
acknowledging cultural factors – such as institutional inertia, power relations
and existing identities within ‘the state’ – that inhibit or enable RMA diffusion.
In fact, it concludes that ‘cultural factors (e.g., shared values about how socie-
ty should be structured and function, and about the purpose and limits of
armed violence) are widely cited in literature as critical to diffusion’ (Gold-
man, 2004: 20). In some instances, the study discards the ontological assump-
tions of neorealism – for example, that the state is a unitary ‘rational’ actor. 
At first glance, the prominence placed on culture might be regarded as
nothing else than a description of a society’s security imaginary. However, a
key element of the notion of (a social or security) imaginary is that there is a
continual, reciprocal and constitutive relationship between what people 
do and what they think they should do, thus between understanding and
practice (so-called performative actions). Although the Goldman study’s
inclusion of cultural factors and their impact on the RMA has the potential to
explain this dialectic, the explanation is truncated, failing to take the next step
and recognize that there is a mutually constitutive relationship. This leaves
the reader with the impression that the security environment is regarded as
objectively given, external to society and not constituted. It can objectively be
determined, and countries respond to it through the policies they adopt. The
RMA changes these policies as it is adopted, but it does not change the way
in which the security environment is constructed. In contrast to a construc-
tivist/interpretive view of the RMA and RMA diffusion, for the authors of
the Goldman study the existing security imaginary (thesis) and the RMA
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(antithesis) never really fuse into a new – constituted – security world (syn-
thesis). Consequently, their (rationalist) methodology (diffusion diagnostics)
gives rise to a linear causal approach to RMA diffusion. 
Apart from different epistemological presumptions, the truncated explana-
tion might in some way also be the result of the objective implicit in the
Goldman study. As Robert Cox famously asserted in a 1981 article, theory is
always for someone and for some purpose. Goldman (2004: 1) expresses the
study’s purpose as follows: 
Even as [US military leaders] try to prod the process [the unfolding RMA] along within
the United States armed forces in the hopes of prolonging American military pre-
eminence, they must attend to the RMA’s diffusion abroad for dynamics outside of the
United States will determine the future of the current RMA as much as, if not more than,
developments inside the United States.
If the goal of the study, then, is to collect information about RMA diffusion
for US decisionmakers, it is clear that the next step of the dialectic between
the RMA and the security imaginaries of those countries emulating the RMA
is irrelevant. For the authors of the Goldman study, it does not matter how
the RMA informs the collective Singaporean mind: the aim is to determine
whether the Singaporean military might be taking greater advantage of the
RMA and how that will affect US security. 
This is typical of what Cox (1992) calls ‘problem-solving’ theory, ‘which
takes the present as given and reasons about how to deal with particular
problems within the existing order of things’, as opposed to critical theory,
which ‘stands back from the existing order of things to ask how that order
came into being, how it may be changing, and how that change may be influ-
enced or channelled’. A key difference is that a problem-solving approach
‘focuses synchronically upon the immediate and reasons in terms of fixed
relationships, [whereas] critical theory works in a more historical and
diachronic dimension’.
An interpretive methodology for the study of military isomorphism would
place emphasis on the nature of change (if any) that the diffusion of the RMA
is bringing about in the constitution of security in other countries. It is thus
necessary to study change in greater depth than that articulated in policy
documents or statements by elite strata in society about security. Although
these ‘first-order’ changes manifesting in an immediately observable way
might portray perceptions of the security world, they are not a mirror image 
of the security imaginary, which denotes a much more complex and wider
cultural background to social practices. 
A rationalist approach can be criticized in two respects. First, it makes 
certain ontological presumptions (both factual and normative) about interna-
tional relations, such as the existence of international anarchy and how states
pursue their interests within such an international society. These presump-
tions lead not only to a one-sided view of international relations, but to the
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reproduction of this distorted construction of international relations. Second,
the positivist epistemology of a traditional approach does not acknowledge
subjectivity in security thinking and practice, and thus minimizes the role
attributed to culture in security-related practices. Even when cultural factors
are acknowledged, a rationalist approach does not go far enough in recog-
nizing the dynamic nature of culture and therefore negates the dialectical
relationship between security practices and cultural factors. Culture is but a
variable, and the relationship between culture and RMA adoption is treated
as causal, rather than constitutive (see Weldes, 2003: 8). 
Tracing the Contours of a Security Imaginary
Having outlined the inadequacy of the rationalist basis of neorealist explana-
tions of military isomorphism, I will now examine the heuristic of a security
imaginary and how it comes into being through the interaction among
knowledge, power and practice.
As noted above, the first-order changes as consciously articulated in aspects
of security policy are insufficient to gauge the impact of the RMA on a 
society. This is precisely because they might only reflect disembodied ideas
of an elite regarding what they think security policy should look like. The
security imaginary is not reducible to these articulations. Taylor (2004: 23)
notes that the social imaginary is how ‘ordinary people’ (in addition to civil
servants, professors of security studies or the CEOs of arms companies)
imagine their social environment. It is shared by large groups of people, if not
society as a whole, and is the common understanding that makes common
practices possible and as a result creates a shared sense of legitimacy. 
To delineate a structuring principle of the common understandings that
make security practices possible in a society is not an easy task. Like other
imaginary social significations (e.g. God in religious cultures), those primary
significations that constitute the security world have no precise place of 
existence where one might look for them. The collective subconscious of 
society is difficult to study in Freudian fashion. An aggravating factor is that,
where security of the state is concerned, ‘ordinary people’ often have little
direct say in decisions to go to war or to buy certain arms and not others.
However, if ordinary people’s acceptance or rejection of (or indifference to)
their exclusion from security policy is seen as an act of cultural expression, it
may well provide a pointer to a structuring principle. For example, the 
apathy of ordinary people in relation to their marginalization in state security
policy could be explained and problematized, instead of being overlooked as
a given of the Westphalian system. In the same sense, a critical interpretation
of security practices (and not just those by elites in the security sector) that
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have become common sense might offer a glimpse of the context of deeper
cultural meanings concerning the security world.
The argument thus links up with David Campbell’s (1998) Writing Security,
a key constructivist text in IR. Campbell explains the Cold War in terms of
representations of US and Soviet Union identity as opposed to material
threat. For Campbell, a set of representational practices must be redeployed
to continually reproduce identity (an understanding of the self, others and
the world). Similarly, the interpretation of security practices argued for here
is critical as opposed to conventional (Hopf, 1998: 181–185). Conventional
constructivism leaves space for a positivist methodology (or ‘normal sci-
ence’) and claims to be normatively neutral. It treats identity as a cause of
state action and leaves it at that. This is a position that critical constructivists
cannot fathom, because they see theory as constitutive. In addition, critical
constructivism aims at ‘exploding the myths associated with identity forma-
tion’ by unmasking power relations in the interest of enlightenment and
emancipation (Hopf, 1998: 184; see also Booth, 1991). It thus also ‘claims an
interest in change, and a capacity to foster change’ (Hopf, 1998: 184), or, as
Farrell (2002a: 59) dramatizes, ‘social theory is a weapon for waging war on
inequality and injustice in world politics’.5
To facilitate a critical interpretation of how certain military models come to
inform security imaginaries around the world, it is useful to outline the three
analytically separable dimensions of the process of social representation
implicit in a cultural approach. This will be done with an eye on how the 
military comes to be constructed in society. These dimensions are articula-
tion, interpellation and enactment, and relate in particular to the relationship
between power and the organization of social meanings (Althusser, 1970;
Hall, 1980; Muppidi, 1999: 125). 
Articulation is the coming of a belief that two meaning-elements – such as
‘military’ and ‘defence’ – are naturally associated, linked to one another (see
Hall, 1980: 324). Such associations are not necessarily intrinsic or self-evident.
Their arrangement may be conventional (i.e. a product of habit) or arbitrary
(Muppidi, 1999: 125). The connection between ‘statehood’ and ‘military 
capability’ described by Eyre & Suchman (1996) is an example from the field
of security of how certain terms and ideas come to connote one another. The
authors argue that possessing a defence force has become a symbol of state-
hood aptly reflected in the following statement by Sylvanus Olympio, presi-
dent of Togo from 1960 to 1966: ‘We cannot be an independent nation
without an army of some sort’ (cited in Eyre & Suchman, 1996: 79). A further
case in point is Namibia, of which Eyre & Suchman (1996: 82) write: ‘As a
symbol of their statehood, the incipient Namibian state created a flag and an
army of more than a thousand soldiers. That the army was (and remains)
Joelien Pretorius Explaining Military Isomorphism 107
5 For further discussion on critical theory in security studies, see Wyn Jones (1999).
essentially militarily insignificant when compared with those of its possible
foes . . . is irrelevant to its clearly significant symbolic role.’ 
Having a defence force is, however, not a necessary condition for statehood,
as illustrated by Costa Rica’s decision not to have one. And, contrary to how
mainstream approaches to security would have it, the decision to have a
defence force is also not based on external threat or necessitated by national
interests that come with statehood. Rather, the thought of not having a
defence force would, for most people who have to decide on this matter, 
‘violate their sense of being at that particular time and place’ (Somers &
Gibson, quoted in Latham, 2000: 16). These ideas are not unique to Togo or
Namibia, but are transnational conceptions of what constitutes a ‘state’.
Among articulated meanings are identities, what Foucault (1970) would
call ‘subject-positions’. Subjects (or actors) are identified, and the roles they
fulfil, their derivative interests and the relationships between them are con-
jured by forging links between sets of meanings. Articulation entails the
weaving of an ontological narrative or telling a ‘constitutive story’ to make
sense of the world or events, institutions or actions in the world (Latham,
2000: 16).6 These stories make use of extant cultural ‘raw material’ such as 
linguistic resources or lived experience, but the story (or plot) that is imposed
on a complex array of lived experience, for example, is selective and reduc-
tive. Rather than a true reflection, the narrative invokes from the range of
experiences only those that can be interpreted in support of a storyline. In
this respect, Jutta Weldes (1996: 295) outlines how the orthodox US story
about the ‘Cuban missile crisis’ was produced: 
the ‘missile crisis’ was constructed out of articulations that defined the Soviet Union, the
United States, Latin America, the ‘Western hemisphere’, Cuba, the Castro government
and ‘the Cuban people’ as particular kinds of objects. It depended as well on various
quasi-causal arrangements, including the pervasive invocation of the ‘Munich’ syn-
drome and the dangers of appeasement, falling of dominoes and of Trojan horses.7
Officials (and others) build security narratives from ‘real’ facts and existing
cultural ‘raw material’ (used to fix meanings). As for ‘real’ facts, the sheer
existence of things will govern how they may be adduced. That Saddam
Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction posed an imminent threat to world
peace was discredited when no such weapons were found. Similarly, gaps in
cultural raw materials limit narratives, prompting Weldes (1996: 286) to refer
to ‘the interpretive possibilities permitted by interactive discourses or inter-
subjective structures of meaning available within a particular situation at a
particular historical juncture’. The orthodox construction of the Cuban 
missile crisis benefited, for example, from the identities that were constructed
around the Soviet Union and the United States from the 1940s onwards. 
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People following a narrative sometimes see themselves in a character. In the
narrative, the character’s identity or subject-position is created by the articu-
lation of meanings. Althusser (1970) terms being drawn into such an identity
interpellation, the second dimension of representation. For the person drawn
in, ‘recruited’ or ‘hailed’ as a subject, the representation and the social rela-
tionships it constructs come to make sense. The extent to which people take
up interpellations is an indication of the extent to which they are convinced
and compelled by the associations between meanings in a narrative
(Muppidi, 1999: 126). Or, as Jerome Bruner (1991: 13) would say, interpella-
tion reflects the ‘acceptability’ of a narrative.
Because connections between meanings are not intrinsic, they are often con-
tested, and therefore articulation and interpellation involve what Muppidi
(1999: 126) refers to as the ‘politics of meaning fixing’. Social groups struggle
among one another to gain pre-eminence over social thought and practice.
One way to get the public (or officials, for that matter) to believe a storyline,
and therefore to regard one set of links between meanings as legitimate and
not another, is to state them consistently as natural, self-evident and unprob-
lematic. To sustain the ‘regime of truth’ (to borrow again from Foucault
[1980]) of a narrative, articulations must be reproduced continuously so that
the connections are reconfirmed. The aim is for a particular representation of
an object, event or person to become common sense – that is, ‘treated as if
they neutrally or transparently reflected reality’ (Weldes, 1996: 303). This
stage of representation can be likened to Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hege-
mony. Hegemony is a kind of dominance over social thought and practice so
deeply rooted in social life that those who are being dominated regard it as
natural. It is like a horizon beyond which society finds it impossible to look
(Feenberg, 1995a: 10; see also Clifford Geertz’s [1975] work on ‘common
sense’). Social groups engage in political work to fix meanings and sustain
them, but they are not the only locus of agency that sustains a narrative.
Enaction, the third dimension of representation, occurs when people have
identified with a subject-position dictated by the social relations scripted in a
narrative and start to enact the role that corresponds with their sense of 
identity. This ‘social doing’ in itself reproduces the links between meanings
and as such sustains the narrative. In a similar way, security practices not
only carry the understanding of security to expression, but reproduce the
security imaginary. The structure created by a narrative is therefore sus-
tained by agency, and the agents are not only elites and officials that have
power over opinion, but also ‘ordinary people’ that enact a narrative and in
that way produce reality. Cynthia Enloe (1989: 16) takes up this point when
she remarks that, as the wives of colonial administrators or as missionaries,
travel writers and anthropologists, women from imperialist countries filled
their roles in a way that perpetuated colonial subjugation of African, Latin
American and Asian women, even if they were not themselves the architects
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of colonial policies and might themselves have been victims of gendered 
relations of power. 
The sources of power through which a narrative is created and sustained
are manifold, and so too the power relations that a narrative creates. At this
stage, it might be more useful to talk about discourse in the Foucauldian
sense rather than ontological narratives, although the two are closely related.
Discourse is a ‘system of representation’ that reflects the mutual reinforcing
character of power and knowledge, conduct and language. People enact the
identities that strengthened them and view a storyline of a narrative as ‘true’
because a specific discourse turns up across different texts and practices at
different social institutions, supporting the same framework for talking
about and acting upon an issue. This Foucault referred to as a discursive 
formation (Hall, 1997: 44). 
The power that creates and sustains a discourse is not from a single source
or in a single direction – for example, top down from the state or ruling class
to the margins that have no resources or access to fix meanings for society
based on their lived experience. Power circulates and permeates and is repro-
duced on every level of social life, whether public or private, the law and the
economy, or the family and sexuality (Hall, 1997: 49). As a result of diverse
forms of political power, there are thus multiple hierarchies. Moreover, the
multiple hierarchies, Enloe (1996: 193) writes, 
do not sit on the social landscape like tuna, egg and cheese sandwiches sitting on an icy
cafeteria counter, diversely multiple but unconnected. They relate to each other, some-
times in ways that subvert one another, sometimes in ways that provide each with their
respective resiliency. The bedroom’s hierarchy is not unconnected to the hierarchies of
the international coffee exchange or of the foreign ministry. 
A final point related to power, knowledge and the formation of the imagin-
ary, is that those at the ‘margins . . . and bottom rungs’ (Enloe, 1996) do not
just wait to be interpellated and, even if interpellated, do not necessarily play
the role scripted in the narrative in zombie-like fashion. There are forms of
resistance aptly described by James Scott (1985) as ‘weapons of the weak’ that
highlight how the ‘powerless’ assert their own understanding of the world
within the framework of dominant discourses. Although ordinary people’s
perception of security is the target of manipulation by elites, they can also 
be the brake on elite adventurism. Judith Butler’s (1993, 1997) notion of
performativity can be invoked here to show that the mutually reinforcing
relationship between understanding and doing does not necessarily imply
continuity (i.e. affirmation of subjectivity). Butler understands the agency of
a subject that engages in representational practices as socially constructed,
but not predetermined. Subjectivity (or, in this case, a particular understand-
ing of security) need not be reproduced. Through a dialectic relationship
between what people do and what they think they should do, diachronically,
meanings can change (be renegotiated), and thus the social imaginary can
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transform itself over time (see Kubalkova, 1998: 30–31). This is also true for
societies’ imaginary of their security world. 
The complexity of a security imaginary should be clear from the above 
discussion. Multiple discourses feature and interact in the social imaginary
and affect how people come to understand and practice security in a society.
Power is important to fix meanings that would induce hegemony in the 
security world, but we should not only look to the conventional sources of
power to get a sense of the security imaginary. For that, we have to include
‘ordinary people’ as well as the ‘margins, silences and bottom rungs’ and
how they contribute to the constitution of security. Their contribution is espe-
cially on the interpretive level of social representation – in other words,
where meanings come to connote things. Ordinary people’s lived experience
and cultural references provide the cultural raw material that could be drawn
upon to legitimize denoted (first-order) meanings, which are forged by elites. 
There are two disconnects prevalent in the way security is often conceptu-
alized in IR that cast doubt on whether IR is the appropriate location for the
security-imaginary approach. First, IR makes an apparently commonsensical
distinction between ‘inside’ (domestic) and ‘outside’ (international), and, 
second, IR is preoccupied with a military notion of security as opposed to
non-military security. These disconnects are best reflected by the terms social
security and national security, respectively. Social security entails soft policy
issues in the domestic realm, such as old-age pensions. National security
commonly denotes a foreign policy or military response directed at the out-
side world (Neocleous, 2006: 376, 364). It could surely be argued that ‘for
most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about
daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security,
income security, security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of
human security all over the world’ (Wood & Shearing, 2007: 65). Given the
inside/outside and military/non-military disconnects, can IR cope with a
widening of the security agenda not just to include non-military threats and
individuals as referent objects of security (see Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde,
1998), but with (in)security as rooted in culture?
The answer can be gauged from Kaldor’s insight that an imaginary war (the
Cold War) was necessary to deal with societal problems in both the East and
the West. The constructivist turn in IR provides theoretical space to question
the apparent disconnects in IR’s conceptions of security. What Kaldor 
recognizes implicitly, Neocleous (2006) makes explicit through tracing the
conceptual, political and historical links between the concepts social security
and national security in the United States during the 1930s. US President
Franklin D. Roosevelt equated the New Deal with national security, noting
‘our nation’s programme of social and economic reform is therefore a part of
defense, as basic as armaments themselves’ (quoted in Neocleous, 2006: 375).
But, Roosevelt’s plan for US security did not stop at US borders. It involved
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rolling out the same principle to the ‘family of Nations’, fabricating economic
order on a global scale. In this sense, national security is not only defence of
‘a way of life’, but expanding/imposing ‘a way of life’. Neocleous thus solves
the security disconnects of mainstream IR through bringing together themes
in security studies and international political economy. 
The security imaginary makes explicit the relationship between the social
and the security imaginary. The notion of a security imaginary is not simply
an extension of the concept ‘social imaginary’ so as to apply it to the study of
security, but instead refers to that part of the social imaginary as ‘a map of
social space’ that is specific to society’s common understanding and expecta-
tions about security and makes practices related to security possible (see also
Taylor’s [2004: 26] remark on social space). The security imaginary takes 
cognisance of the cultural raw material that needs to be present for various
associations (or meanings or ‘signifieds’) that the word ‘security’ might
denote at different times for a society. Although this article deals with mili-
tary isomorphism (and therefore a ‘national security’ issue), it is recognized
that the emulation of a military model is framed in narratives of power and
resistance. It cannot be seen separately from what Neocleous (2000, 2006)
refers to as the fabrication of social and economic order both inside and out-
side the originating country. 
Having outlined the heuristic of a security imaginary and how it comes into
being through the interaction among knowledge, power and practice, the
article will now turn to the ways in which the security imaginary might come
to be influenced by models of military transformation in other societies.
Military Isomorphism as Homogenizing Security
Imaginaries
The social imaginary that invokes and is in turn reproduced by the real and
symbolic connections that constitute a society and its boundaries is prone to
change over time. Trans-societal exchanges result in the negotiation of new
meanings and bring about a cultural dialectic that could transform the social
imaginary. These exchanges are likely to increase as access to travel and
information technology increases. As that part of the social imaginary that
relates to the understanding of security in society, the security imaginary is
also subject to change through this process. The security imaginary is there-
fore open to influence from perceptions, beliefs and understandings of other
societies about security. 
One way of exploring this process is by means of sociological institutional-
ism. As a constructivist approach, sociological institutionalism ‘examines
how norms evolve within transnational organizational fields, are diffused
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through transnational professional networks, and take worldwide effect’
(Farrell, 2005: 450). Norms derive from shared beliefs about what can be 
considered normal and acceptable behaviour in a given situation in a society.
Norms prescribe behaviour (what should be done) based on a society’s
understanding of the world and its place in it. It is in this way that norms
emanate from the social imaginary and in turn reproduce it. 
A sociological-institutionalist approach assumes that there are trans-
national norms that shape how states generate military power. Farrell (2005:
450) identifies two sets of norms in this respect, namely, norms of conven-
tional warfare and norms of international humanitarian law. Norms of con-
ventional warfare delineate the basic blueprint for military organization,
namely, ‘standing, standardized, technologically structured’ (Farrell, 2005:
462) military forces. Norms of humanitarian law, in turn, outline what modes
(e.g. genocide) and means (e.g. chemical weapons) of warfare are unaccept-
able. As such, they define what is morally appropriate behaviour in military
operations. Farrell considers both sets of norms as expressions of world cul-
ture. For the purposes of the argument here, the present section will mainly
focus on norms of conventional warfare.
Farrell’s approach is useful in that it tries to incorporate rationalist
approaches in a constructivist theory to explain the seeming isomorphism in
the way that states generate military power. In Farrell’s view, this isomorph-
ism is a result of normative pressure in addition to the logic of a security
imperative, maximizing power and the notion that military organizations are
by nature competitive. Similarly, bureaucratic or alliance politics transpire
within a normative context. Policymakers may manipulate military policy to
gain advantage for their own organizations (or themselves). States may direct
alliance policy to favour their national interests. However, these factors occur
within the framework of world military cultural norms. States organize their
militaries in a certain way and engage in warfare in a certain way because that
is what is expected of them as part of the society of states. To be sure, when a
state perceives an increase in threat, it may stretch norms that are not well
established or engage in strategic behaviour within the limits set by the norm
to address the security imperative. In the same sense, in the event that policy-
makers manipulate bureaucratic or alliance policy, this behaviour is either
overridden by normative pressure or legitimized by it (Farrell, 2005: 452). 
From the discussion of social representation, it should be clear that there is
a two-pronged process at work when it comes to the way normative pressure
facilitates military isomorphism. First, norms need to be established. Certain
practices need to be endowed with meaning, namely, that they are normal
and acceptable behaviour for states to generate military power. This phase
cannot be seen separately from international political discourses that create
the hegemony (in a Gramscian sense) or obviousness (in an Althusserian
sense) that determines what is ‘normal and acceptable behaviour’ for states.
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Latham (2000: 7) explains, for example, how the historical and mutually 
constitutive relationship between discourses of the ‘laws of war’, on the one
hand, and the politico-cultural identities of ‘Christendom’, ‘Europe’ and
(most recently) ‘the West’, on the other, contributed to the development of
the category of ‘inhumane weapons’. Weapons are not classified as inhu-
mane because of their objective properties that make them inherently viler
than other weapons. Rather, this classification derived from European
attempts at the end of the 19th century to prove (not least to themselves) that
European societies epitomized civilization. As European officials started to
identify with this self-representation, they established norms (or endowed
certain practices with the meaning) of ‘civilized international conduct’. 
In the same sense, the norms of conventional warfare, for example, did not
evolve because ‘standing, standardized, technologically structured’ forces
made objective military sense. Their development is interlinked with domi-
nant political discourses, and, when scrutinized, it is clear that these dis-
courses contain elements of cultural imperialism. In fact, Farrell’s typically
conventional constructivist account of how these norms evolved to become
‘world culture’ highlights and to an extent reproduces these elements. His
account is dealt with in some detail here because it illustrates a fundamental
point in the discourse on the homogenization of military behaviour that 
conventional constructivist explanations often ignore. 
Farrell (2005: 464–465) sketches the historical evolution of the Western 
military model of standing armies and how this is intricately linked with the
rise of the modern state. He then notes how this model was imposed by the
colonial powers on their colonies and taken up by other powers to guard
against European expansion. The professionalization of the officer corps in
Europe and the United States by the end of the 19th Century was an impor-
tant driver of global military isomorphism, since it became the mechanism
through which ‘world-wide institutionalisation of collective beliefs about
appropriate military forms and practices’ occurred. 
This is also true for contemporary diffusion of these norms, ‘which involves
officers being sent to be trained in foreign academies, and foreign military
advisors, military literature and equipment being received’ (Farrell, 2005:
465). What Farrell understands under ‘foreign’ seems to be ‘Western’. He
specifically notes that ‘developed states’ (the USA, Canada, the UK, Germany
and France) run schemes to educate foreign military officers. The most
prominent of these schemes are the British Military Advisory and Training
Team (BMATT) and the US International Military Education and Training
(IMET) programme, giving world norms an even more restricted Anglo-
Saxon substance. He definitely does not look to Chinese, Japanese, Latin
American or African norms of military organization to determine how 
universal the ‘world’ military norms are. 
Farrell then distinguishes between two sets of countries when it comes to
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the current adherence to norms of conventional warfare. For major and
regional powers, it makes sense – that is, military and economic sense – to 
follow these norms. On the other hand, 
as emulators become increasingly removed from the position of the great powers, in
terms of both resource levels and geostrategic circumstances, however, isomorphism
makes decreasing military sense and is more likely to be due to normative pressure. Yet
ironically, this is where most of the emulation occurs (Farrell, 2005: 465).
Normative isomorphism seems for the most part a one-way flow, ‘with the
poor and weak and peripheral copying the rich and strong and central’ (John
W. Meyer, quoted in Farrell, 2005: 466). This Farrell attributes to weak states
wanting the prestige attached to great-power military symbols, as well as the
certainty provided by great-power scripts for military action. Instead of
explicitly looking for deeper explanations for this one-way normative 
isomorphism, he seems to be saying that strong and regional powers follow
norms of conventional warfare because they make military sense for them
(are objective and rational). Weak states, on the other hand, follow these
norms because they are ‘cultural dopes’ and naively think that adhering to
these norms will bring about prestige akin to that of major powers. 
What Farrell overlooks is that norms of conventional warfare are imagined
properties of Western militaries sold as ‘world culture’, not least by his own
discussion. The fact that other societies emulate these norms is tied in with a
certain discourse of development. This discourse is largely rooted in the
West’s conceptions of its own development portrayed as progress, growth
and expansion. The West’s military dominance is imagined as confirmation
that it has found the way to organize militaries, just as the West’s economic
dominance is interpreted as a sign of its having discovered ‘the way of life’ for
human societies (Cornelius Castoriadis, quoted in Tomlinson, 1991: 154). In
both cases, the West feels it needs to educate other societies in these matters.
This discourse establishes identities, such as ‘developed’ and ‘underdevel-
oped’ or ‘developing’ societies, as well as the relations between them, and
can be portrayed in terms of cultural domination. 
The concept of cultural imperialism, as Tomlinson (1991: 3) notes, is itself
the result of a largely Western discourse and is invoked by different scholars
to mean different things. In this article, cultural imperialism is the result of a
certain way of perceiving ‘development’, one that has its origins in Western
societies. Cultural domination is not seen as the imposition of a Western way
of military organization on another society. Rather, cultural imperialism is
seen in the Gramscian sense as making certain norms that are characteristic
of Western societies (some would say the ‘Global North’) seem like common
military sense. To be sure, and as Farrell acknowledges, agency needs to be
recognized in the decision to enact a military script or not.
This relates to the second phase of the two-pronged process of military iso-
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morphism through normative pressure. After being articulated, norms are
diffused through interpellation and enactment. The process of interpellation
occurs through professional networks, such as BMATT or IMAT, where
scripts and norms are taught. This is not to say that states slavishly follow
these scripts. It does suggest, however, that norms become part of a state’s
cultural raw material, which their agents may draw upon when it comes to
military practice. Whether norms are emulated is a function of cultural match
between the discourses that these norms emanate from and the local social
imaginary (Farrell, 2005: 456). 
A quotation from Major General Paul Kagame (later to become the presi-
dent of Rwanda) illustrates the point. Kagame asserts: ‘We [Rwandans] are
used to fighting wars in a very cheap way. . . . Our people don’t drive tanks,
we don’t have any aircrafts. They don’t fight with fighter aircrafts. People
move on foot. They eat very little food. We are able to go like that for many
years without a problem’ (quoted in Wakabi & Ochieng, 1999). With this
statement, he is not saying that Rwandans choose not to follow the ‘world
cultural’ norm of a technologically structured force because they are too poor
or have no military need for it. He is saying that, at that particular point in
time, Rwandans’ understanding of warfare, and indeed of themselves and
the world, is different from that of Western societies. There is not a sufficient
perceived cultural match (or overlap) between Rwanda’s security imaginary
and those of Western society from where this norm originates. On the other
hand, should Rwandans start viewing themselves and warfare in terms that
correspond with Western military norms, they do not want to be told that
they are cultural dopes or militarily irrational. This is the liberal fallacy. A
number of liberal multinational institutions (such as the World Bank, the UN
and the IMF) and nongovernmental organizations prescribe ‘world norms’ of
disarmament and demilitarization to developing countries, but invoke a 
similar impression of cultural imperialism by denying developing countries
freedom of choice of the narratives and identities they want to enact.
Perceived cultural match (or overlapping social imaginaries) and reinforc-
ing discourses are important factors in the process by which one society’s
security imaginary is infused by military models from other societies. If 
cultures are perceived to be mismatched, discourses are not reinforcing, or
social imaginaries diverge, military models from one society may not come to
infuse another’s security imaginary. Or, they may be constituted quite differ-
ently in the adopting society or may be adopted for different reasons than
originally developed. For example, decisionmakers in one society may 
perceive a degree of ‘match’ about desirable weapons and military training,
and there may be discursive overlap in the norms adhered to in the two 
societies. If, however, public corruption, while present, is not a major force in
the ‘model’ country, whereas it is ever-present in the ‘recipient’ country, per-
haps even ‘necessary’ to sustain the social fabric, the diffused model may
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come to be constituted quite differently in the latter. Charles Taylor (2004:
196), in tracing the forms of social imaginaries that grounded the growth of
Western modernity, offers another possibility:
If we give its [sic] rightful place to the different understandings that animate similar
institutions and practices even in the West, it should be all the more obvious how much
greater are the differences among the major civilizations. The fact that these are in a
sense growing closer to each other, and learning from each other, doesn’t do away with,
but only masks the differences, because the understanding of what it is to borrow or to
come close to the other is often very different from different standpoints.
The Western model of military organization is certainly ‘the object of 
creative imitation’, to use Taylor’s (2004: 196) phrase. The reasons for the
adoption of a certain model and the way in which this model is adapted 
by non-Western states have deep cultural roots corresponding with these
societies’ social and security imaginaries. Taylor calls the divergent develop-
ment paths of different societies ‘multiple modernities’. Andrew Feenberg
(1995b) even allows for the pursuit of ‘alternative modernity’ where the
divergence from a particular development path is more deliberate. The 
idea that globalization will homogenize social imaginaries and, with them,
security imaginaries needs to be viewed with Taylor’s cautionary remark and
Feenberg’s margin of possibility in mind. 
Conclusion
This article set out to contribute an alternative way of thinking about 
military isomorphism through the heuristic of a security imaginary. The
security imaginary is that part of the social imaginary that deals with the
understanding of the security world and in turn makes security practices
possible. Various scholars have looked at specific case-studies to explain
military diffusion from a cultural perspective. There is, however, a sense
that most of these contributions provide weak cultural explanations,
because they treat culture only as an enabling or inhibiting context for emu-
lation, while domestic politics is seen as the actual mechanism that causes
military diffusion (Goldman, 2006: 70). The heuristic of a security imaginary
contributes to stronger cultural explanations of military emulation by 
conceptualizing the politics of meaning-fixing as part of a process of social
representation, which in turn provides insight into a society’s cultural ortho-
doxy as such. This approach allows us not only to view culture as a causal
mechanism for military diffusion, but also to investigate how a foreign 
military model may come to be constituted in and have an impact on the
constitution of the emulating country. 
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